




The Role of Religious Belief in the Formation of Political Opinions: 
Proposal for a Study in Delhi, India 
 
 A secular society…values the equal rights of all citizens as well as freedom and equality among 
them. The function of the state is to ensure the access of these to all citizens, thus ensuring their 
well-being. Implicit in this are notions of democracy, and therefore the right of citizens to support 
as independent individuals their own views on issues before the state…citizenship, which confers 
human rights, such as…the right to education, health, and social welfare…In such a situation the 
religious control over social institutions decreases in importance since many of their functions 
should ideally be taken over by the state and by civil society (Thapar 2006, on secularism in 
India). 
 
 Democracy and human rights have gained widespread normative endorsement 
across national governments in recent decades, diffused largely through international 
institutions that import “world culture” norms (Meyer et al., 1997; Boli & Thomas, 1997; 
McNeely, 1995) and visible in the spread of democratization in the second half of the 
twentieth century (Philpott, 2007; Huntington, 1991). These principles of “world culture” 
bare striking resemblance to those that modernization theorists predicted would 
characterize all modern societies. Theorists such as James Colemen and Alex Inkeless 
asserted that principles such as individualism, universalism, equality, rationalism, and a 
belief that human flourishing results from technical and scientific progress are ubiquitous 
elements of modernity (So, 1990). This theory informed the international development 
work that has expanded considerably since the mid-twentieth century. Therefore it is not 
coincidental that more recent theorists such as John Boli and George Thomas (1997) 
identify these principles as characteristic of the norms that international institutions 
diffuse to the “world polity.” 
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  In contrast to modernization theorists, world culture theorists suggest that 
although these principles are formally endorsed by international institutions and 
governments that wish to be recognized as legitimate, this does not mean they are 
embraced by citizens at the local level (Boli & Thomas, 1997). However there seems to 
be a lack of research on how local populations in diverse cultures might diverge from 
these norms in their understanding and articulation of their beliefs. In particular, there is 
little understanding of how populations in societies that are non-Western but urban and 
modern may negotiate between their beliefs and formally endorsed “world culture” 
principles embodied in human rights treaties and democratic norms.   
 However it is clear that such divergences from world culture norms do exist. The 
most significant challenge in recent decades to the formal consensus around human rights 
and democracy may be the vastly increased presence of religion in political matters. In 
diverse parts of the world, religion has emerged in the last several decades as a driving 
force behind social movements, revolutions, and debates regarding national laws 
(Habermas, 2006). At times, religious political actors may diverge from liberal 
democratic norms by placing faith in absolute truth above adherence to the procedural 
norms of democracy (Reichley, 1986); seeking to undermine the legitimacy of the secular 
sovereign state (Philpott, 2002), or even by seeking to use the secular state to persecute 
minorities, as may be the case with the Hindu Right in India (Chaterjee, 1998). 
Accordingly, liberal political theorists typically assert that religion should remain private 
in liberal democracies (e.g. Rawls, 1993). However other political theorists insist that 
religious political actors can be legitimate participants in liberal democracies (e.g., 
Habermas, 2006; Taylor, 1998; Kalyvas, 1998). Furthermore, scholars point to the 
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historical and contemporary role of religion in supporting human rights and democracy 
movements (Johnston, 2003; Stepan, 2001; Appleby, 2000).  These scholars assert that 
religion has been and can continue to be a powerful force in support of liberal principles, 
or what sociologists might call “world culture” norms.  
Empirical Gap  
 In spite of this lively theoretical debate, there is a dearth of empirical research that 
examines how every-day religious citizens draw from their religious beliefs to form 
political judgments, and the extent to which they believe they can and should confine 
religious beliefs to private contexts. This may be particularly important to understand in 
newly democratic, rapidly modernizing nations. Contrary to the predictions of earlier 
modernization theorists, more recent theorists emphasize that modernity will take 
different shapes depending on the place and time in which it emerges (Kaviraj, 2005; 
Eisenstadt, 2000). The way citizens draw from their religious beliefs to form political 
judgments and view the relationship between religion and politics may have important 
implications for the shape modernity takes in rapidly developing nations (Kaviraj, 2005).  
Furthermore, as religious-political movements may currently represent both the most 
significant challenge as well as an important source of support to human rights and 
democracy (Appleby, 2000), understanding the way religious citizens in modernizing 
societies form political judgments may have great significance for policy-makers and 
institutions seeking to promote world culture norms.  Thus the importance of research on 
the role of religion in politics is increasingly noted by political scientists (e.g. Snyder et 
al., forthcoming 2010; Calhoun et al., forthcoming 2010; Hurd, 2007;  Philpott, 2007 & 
2002; Stepan, 2001).  
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 The proposed study will examine how religious citizens in India draw from 
religious beliefs to explain their judgments about what is right, and the contexts in which 
they do and believe they should apply religious teachings to political judgments.   This 
study will serve both academic and more “applied” purposes. It will contribute to our 
understanding of the way modernity is emerging in diverse settings by exploring the 
meaning of religiosity for judgments on what is right in a variety of “private” and 
“public” contexts. Research on how citizens draw from their religious beliefs to form and 
explain their judgments may also be a first step in understanding how political 
movements based on religion garner widespread support, and why quantitative studies 
have revealed correlations between religiosity and political judgments (Stepan, 2010 
forthcoming; Patterson, 2005). 
Spread of Human Rights / World Culture Norms 
 Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, there was significant 
scholarly debate over whether human rights and democracy are appropriate normative 
models for all cultures (Sharma, 2006; e.g. Pollis & Schwab, 1979; American 
Anthropological Association, 1947). However academic discourse seems to have shifted 
in the last decade from whether such universal normative frames are appropriate for all 
cultures to how they have diffused so widely across cultures (e.g. Meyer et al., 1997; Boli 
et al., 1997). According to these scholars, formal adherence to “world culture” norms 
pertaining to diverse aspects of society, including “education, women's rights, social 
security programs, environmental policy, [and] constitutional arrangements” are 
pervasive across the globe (Boli et al., 1997).   
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 This “world culture” does not only contain normative conceptions of moral 
action. It also includes ontological frameworks, including beliefs about human nature and 
the nature of the world. For example, world culture norms implicitly convey conceptions 
of human nature as universal, agentic, and infused with natural needs and rights, as well 
as a view of individuals as the natural unit of decision-making and identity (Meyer & 
Jepperson, 2000). The world in this “world culture” is “disenchanted” and characterized 
by the view that “rational social action is the route to equality, comfort, and the good life” 
(Boli & Thomas, 1997: 12). Each individual is viewed as equally possessing these 
qualities and potentials, regardless of national or sub-national affiliation.  
 The principles of world culture are embodied in the human rights movement, and 
formally articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Boli & Thomas, 
1997).   The human rights movement has grown in strength and breadth in the last quarter 
of the twentieth century, when a “proliferation of international laws, treaties, covenants, 
and other instruments devoted to the articulation and protections of human rights” 
emerged (Appleby 2000: 247). The appearance of compliance with the rights inscribed in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has become an important part of proving the 
legitimacy of a state (Meyer et al., 1997).  
Resurgence of Religion  
 However, it may be that these world culture principles are sometimes contested 
by the global resurgence of religiosity and the increased presence of religion in politics.  
Aspects of some religious beliefs may inherently be in tension with world polity norms, 
which according to Boli & Thomas (1997) are characterized by individualism, 
universalism, rationalization and world citizenship. For example, for some religious 
Wahl  6
citizens, religious ethics based on the value of purity and community may supersede 
those based on individual rights (Shweder et al., 1997). Loyalty to one’s group and 
obedience to authority may trump ideals of universalism and equality (Haidt & Graham, 
2009). In addition, belief in a higher power that transcends time and space may be in 
tension with belief in human agency and the viability or desirability of rational, technical 
progress. Faith in absolute truth may also be contradictory to adherence to the process of 
democracy, which often privileges fair procedures over consequentialist truth claims 
(Reichley, 1986). For example, the belief that a particular behavior is sinful in absolute 
terms may make it difficult to accept a law allowing it, even if the majority in a 
democracy judges it desirable to do so. Similarly, the liberal democratic commitment to 
protection of minorities may be challenged if the minorities are believed to be in violation 
of religious principles that supersede the value of pluralism.  Therefore some religious 
political movements may not share “world culture” principles of individualism, 
universalism, and in particular, rationalization and disenchantment. For example, the 
Indian Hindu nationalist party BJP has been accused of being “hostile” to Muslims 
(Engineer, 2000). Most famously, transnational Islamic movements may question the 
legitimacy of the secular nation-state and call for a government based on Islamic law 
(Philpott, 2002).  
 However, diverse religious actors are also centrally involved in the support of 
‘world culture’ principles.  As religious groups are often transnational in character, they 
may be particularly effective at mobilizing people across cultures for purposes in keeping 
with world culture norms (Thomas, 2005). For example, a substantial inter-religious 
environmental movement draws from religious teachings and works through secular 
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rights and democracy. Conside
                                                   
institutions as well as mosques, temples, and churches.1 Contemporary religious INGOs 
play a significant role in the human rights movement, ranging from service delivery 
organizations such as Catholic Relief Services to those focused on using religion as a tool 
for building peace (Thomas, 2005), such as the International Center for Religion and 
Diplomacy. Historical examples of the role of religion in supporting liberal principles are 
numerous. Christianity furnished much of the ideological backbone of abolition and the 
modern civil rights movement (Morone, 2004). Interpretations of Islam that allow for 
violations of human rights are deeply contested by Islamic scholars and political leaders 
(Stepan, 2001: 235). In fact the state of Pakistan was founded with the hope that Islamic 
principles would ensure universal equality and personal liberty in contrast to the divisions 
common to India society, such as those based on wealth and caste (Iqbal, 1930).  
 It is clear that religious teachings can be drawn from to support a wide range of 
positions, from those that promote “world culture” norms to those that sharply oppose 
them.  However, there is a dearth of empirical research that investigates how every-day 
religious citizens negotiate potential tensions between religious teachings and world 
culture norms. Research that explores how religious individuals draw from religious 
beliefs when they make judgments about what is right, the contexts in which religion is 
salient for how they make judgments, and how they explain the salience of particular 
interpretations of religious teachings compared to competing interpretations may provide 
insight into the relationship between religiosity and modern principles related to human 
ring the potential of religion to act as a powerful force in 
      
1 For example the Forum on Religion and Ecology at Yale University, which offers a Master’s degree in 
Religion & Ecology (http://fore.research.yale.edu).   
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support of and opposed to human rights, it is important to understand how religious 
citizens negotiate this potential tension.    
Reasons for the Increased Presence of Religion in Politics 
 It is particularly important to understand the relationship between religious beliefs 
and political judgments in modernizing societies with relatively new democracies, as it 
may be modernization and the spread of democracy that has caused the increased 
presence of religion in politics. Theorists suggest that increased religiosity may be a 
response to the disorienting changes that accompany modernization. People may seek 
stability and comfort in religion as the world around them shifts (Huntington, 1996; 
Fukuyama, 1992). Other scholars suggest that the resurgence of religion does not indicate 
a revival of tradition, but rather embodies a dynamic response to the modern world. As 
secular ideologies such as communism lose legitimacy, new religious movements may be 
an effective way to mobilize people against the disruption of traditional social forms by 
modern phenomena such as market forces and authoritarian states (Casanova, 1994).  The 
increased presence of religion in politics may also be related to the spread of 
democratization, which broadens the scope of political participation. As more people 
have a voice in the political process, or due to the diffusion of democratic norms believe 
they have a right to such a voice,  formerly private religious beliefs may take on political 
significance (Snyder & Beck, forthcoming 2010). Thus in the new consensus, increased 
religiosity may be the result of modernization rather than in spite of it.   
 This challenges long-standing theory in the social sciences. Eminent social 
theorists such as Durkheim, Weber, Freud, and Marx agreed that as individuals and 
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societies become more modern, they would become less religious (Norris & Inglehart, 
2004). The increased presence of religion in politics brings this “secularization 
hypothesis” into question. Furthermore, theories linking this increased religiosity to 
modernization and democracy call for a re-evaluation of how these changes affect 
individual beliefs. However there is very little research on how individual citizens living 
in rapidly modernizing societies negotiate between their religious beliefs and the 
expectations of the state within which they live. For example, the conditions and 
requirements of work and education often change dramatically in modernizing societies. 
Yet we have little understanding of how religious citizens draw from their beliefs to 
negotiate these changes, or how they experience the potential tension between a relatively 
new democracy and a significantly old religious tradition.  
Re-evaluating modernity  
 Flaws in the predictions of modernization theorists may be due to a faulty theory 
of modernity, which assumed that the way modernity emerged in Western Europe was 
prototypical for how it would emerge elsewhere. Instead, it seems that there are “multiple 
modernities” as the history and sociology of each society shapes the way modernity 
emerges (Eisenstadt, 2000). In particular, the sequence in which modern processes 
develop in a society may influence the form modernity takes. Previous theories of 
modernity assumed a functional interdependence of each aspect of modernity (e.g. 
urbanization, industrialization, democratization). In this view, each ‘ingredient’ of 
modernity facilitated the emergence of the others, so modern processes tended to arise 
together and were dependent on each other. However it may be that modern processes 
emerge in different chronological orders in different places, and the form of modernity 
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that emerges is deeply shaped by this sequence in which ingredients of modernity occur 
(Kaviraj, 2005).  
 According to this theory, in order for modern institutions to uphold the principles 
on which they are based, these institutions must take different forms in different places. 
For example, an institution that upholds the principle of democratic choice in one society 
will not necessarily be able to do so in another. Improvisation is required to adapt 
institutions to the societies in which they are located. In addition, even if modernity 
shares features in common, what we call ‘pre-modern’ takes diverse forms. That which 
comes before modern institutions and practices in any society will shape the modern 
institutions and practices that emerge (Kaviraj, 2005). Therefore, modernity may emerge 
uniquely at different times and in societies with cultural legacies and external pressures 
that are distinct from those experienced by Western Europe. 
Modernity in India 
 As a relatively new democracy with a complex civilization and history that is 
distinct from that of the West, India offers an ideal case study of alternative modernity. 
(Or, one could as easily say, a modernity to which the West is an alternative.) In India, 
the emergence of modern processes of democratization, rationalization of work and 
knowledge, political participation, and religion-state relations share principles with 
Western modernity, such as increasing emphasis on equality in social and political 
relations. However, the ways these new configurations have manifested themselves in the 
Indian context are neither “modern” in the Western European sense nor “traditional” in 
any sense.   This may be due to the different sequence in which modern processes 
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emerged, the sociological organization of Indian society, and the history of beliefs and 
political power in India (Kaviraj, 2005). This study will focus on one particular element 
of modernity, considered essential by modernization theorists: secularism, or the aspect 
of secularism that concerns the relationship between individual religious beliefs and 
public, political processes.  
 The emergence of modernity in India shares principles with modernity as it has 
been theorized generally and witnessed in Western Europe, but these principles are 
realized in social forms and beliefs that diverge from this norm. For example, in contrast 
to the emphasis within modern liberal democracies in the West on individual rights, in 
India rights are currently often accorded to groups. India’s first president Jawaharlal 
Nehru sought to establish a universal civil code based on the European and American 
model. However he conceded special rights for minorities to satisfy the pressures of the 
time, specifically the threat of partition and further divisions of the Indian state. As a 
result, personal law for minority religious groups (such as laws governing marriage, 
divorce, and inheritance) are governed by religious bodies and are thus different for 
Muslims and Hindus. Another unique feature of Indian modernity is in the nature of 
political identity. Political participation is often caste-based, rather than ideologically 
driven. On one hand,  this could be considered “traditional” in that political identity and 
solidarity is based on ascriptive caste identity. Yet on the other hand, it is also uniquely 
modern in that caste groups mobilize for improved rights and access to services such as 
education (Kaviraj, 2005).  
Secularism in India  
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 The unique shape of modernity in India is particularly well demonstrated by the 
form of secularism that has emerged. In Western Europe, democratic constitutions were 
largely introduced after secular institutions had become dominant. In India, democracy 
and secular institutions were introduced with the same constitution (Kaviraj, 2005). Thus, 
it was not universally accepted that secularism should characterize the relationship of the 
state to religion, or that religion should maintain a non-public, private identity. Therefore 
it is not surprising that Indian secularism should be distinct from the form it takes in the 
West. However, this does not entail greater liberty of religion over the state, as might be 
expected given the relatively recent introduction of secularism into a deeply religious 
society. According to Rajeev Bhargava, in India the state in actuality maintains not an 
equal but a “principled” distance from religious groups. The state may interfere with 
religious groups, either to support or restrain their activities, in order to promote 
democratic principles of equality and liberty. Furthermore, the state may do so unevenly 
across religious groups, provided the principles of liberty and equality are the basis for 
state actions. For example, Islamic groups receive more support from the state than 
Hindu groups, owing to the minority status of Muslims. The state may also interfere with 
religious practices that violate principles of liberty and equality, such as rules that 
discriminate against lower castes. In addition, religious groups may use religious 
rationales to motivate political action, provided those actions uphold liberal principles 
(Bhargava, 2007).  
 Some scholars (as well as politicians within the Hindu Right) suggest that 
secularism is “alien” to India. These scholars assert that secularism is a Western, 
Christian imposition that rejects widespread religious worldviews within Indian traditions 
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(Madan, 1998; Nandy, 1998). Scholars such as Ashis Nandy argue that given the nature 
of Indian religion, the division between public and private does not resonate with 
religious Indians (Bhargava 1998, 23). These scholars insist instead that the resources of 
Indian religions are sufficient to create a tolerant, democratic society without recourse to 
secularism (Bhargava, 1998).   
` Yet others disagree, claiming that secularism is not oppositional to religion. In 
this view, secularization is a process that changes the relationship between the state and 
citizens rather than marginalizing religion  (Thapar, 2006:  89). However that which is 
changed in this relationship may have direct consequences for religion. A secular state 
seeks to make citizenship the primary mode by which human rights are realized, and 
these rights are to be equally accessible to citizens regardless of religion or the 
distinctions a religion may make based for example on caste or gender. This requires that 
the state be responsible for ensuring that these rights are realized. This may mean 
interfering with religion when religious bodies resist the acceptance of human rights 
norms. Therefore “the secularizing of society does not oppose religion but prefers that 
religious authorities should not control the institutions linked to social ethics, economic 
development, and cultural change” (Ibid,  85). In other words, according to scholars such 
as Thapar and Bhargava,  the secular state is premised on the recognition of the equal 
human rights of its citizens. Religion can be both a protected right as well as that which 
stands between citizens and rights. The relationship of the state to religion will be 
determined by the position of any religion on these rights, rather than by any inherent 
ideology of secularism in regard to religion.  
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 Therefore, religion is seen as a right of all citizens in a secular state, along with 
other human rights that the state is responsible for fulfilling. Scholars such as Thapar and 
Bhargava insist that there is no tension between the strength of citizens’ religiosity and a 
state that actively grants human rights equally based on citizenship. Yet they also insist 
that in order for the state to ensure the fulfillment of these human rights, religious bodies 
must cede ultimate control of institutions governing education and social welfare to the 
state (Thapar, 2006). They further insist that at times the state may need to interfere with 
the practices of religious groups to ensure these human rights (Bhargava, 2007).  
 This suggests that religious beliefs, or at least the outlook of some religious 
groups, may at times maintain an uneasy relationship with the individual-based human 
rights framework that scholars such as Thapar state is an essential element of 
secularization. Yet, in a country with high levels of religiosity, it is likely that many of 
the citizens who comprise the modern secular institutions established to promote such 
rights are themselves religious.  Understanding the way religious citizens in secular 
institutions make moral judgments may clarify the ways in which human rights are 
perceived, embraced, rejected and negotiated within a secular but religious nation.   
Cross-Pressures 
 In spite of the convenience of dichotomies such as religious versus secular, it is 
likely that many modern citizens do not fit neatly into either category but rather 
experience “cross-pressures” of belief and un-belief (Taylor, 2007). Particularly in 
rapidly modernizing societies, citizens may need to negotiate between inherited beliefs 
and the pressures of contemporary life. India is a deeply religious society, where 
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approximately ninety-three percent of people say they believe in God (Stepan, 
forthcoming 2010; Kumar, 2008). Furthermore, religious practice is highest among the 
well-educated in urban settings, compared to those who have less education or live in 
more rural settings (Stepan, forthcoming 2010; Kumar, 2008). Yet institutions such as 
universities that receive government funding in India are officially secular spaces, 
precluding the formation of religious groups or religious activities on campus2. Thus 
religious university students must navigate contemporary academic norms from the 
perspective of their religious framework.  For example, religious students may negotiate 
both religious and secular epistemological beliefs, as religious and scientific norms about 
the source and nature of truth and knowledge may differ considerably. More generally, 
both religious and secular democratic principles may inform the way religious university 
students make judgments regarding what is right, and they may struggle to negotiate 
potential tensions therein. Understanding the way those of diverse religions in secular 
institutions draw from their beliefs to make judgments about what is right may provide 
insight into the course of modernity in India. 
 
Dissertation Research  
Option 1:  Religious Citizens in Modern Public Institutions 
 The development of modern institutions is typically considered a key element in 




to strengthen a vast array of such institutions, including: primary, secondary and tertiary 
education; an independent judiciary; and an uncorrupt government bureaucracy in which 
civil servants are placed by merit rather than nepotism. The perceived importance of 
these elements of the modern state explains why “statebuilding focuses primarily on 
public institutions – the machinery of the state, from courts to legislators to laws to 
bureaucrats” (Paris & Sisk, 2009). The ubiquity of such institutions may not be because 
they are universally more efficient or naturally sought after. As discussed above, this 
convergence may instead result primarily from the diffusion of world culture norms, such 
as through domestic and international development and state-building projects (Meyer et 
al., 1997).  States may develop institutions to promote mass education, rational justice, 
and scientific / technical progress as they aim for legitimacy on the international stage 
(Meyer et al., 1997). Scholars further assert that in spite of the seeming convergence 
across states in these institutions, they actually diverge locally in diverse ways depending 
on the culture and history of the society (Kaviraj, 2005). However, there is little empirical 
research that examines the interaction between local and global norms within these 
institutions.  
 One way to begin such an inquiry is to focus on individuals within institutions 
that meet the expectations of modern statehood, such as professionals within the 
judiciary, lower and higher education, and the civil service or university students in 




Option One: Professionals in Public Institutions 
 One might expect that public institutions are governed according to the same 
“world culture” norms that justify their existence: the importance of the individual, 
rationalism, scientific progress, and human agency. However, past research in India has 
shown that in this deeply religious society, worldviews often diverge markedly from 
these norms (Shweder et al., 1997). For example, religious beliefs may not always 
support rationalism and trust in human agency. Familial obligations, obedience to 
authority, loyalty to one’s community, and rules regarding purity may be viewed as more 
important than individual development. Scholars suggest that these views may be 
characteristic of religious societies across the world and non-Western societies in 
particular (e.g. Haidt & Graham 2009a & 2009b).  
 However, given the fluid, porous nature of culture (Benhabib, 2002) it is unlikely 
that in aan urban, modern city such as New Delhi, citizens who work in these institutions 
are wholly members of the   “collectivistic” in-group-focused society described in much 
scholarship on non-Western cultures (e.g. Triandis et al., 1995).  Yet scholars also assert 
that total convergence with world culture norms is unlikely given the variety of beliefs, 
practices and structures within which modern institutions emerge (Kaviraj, 2005). It is 
more likely that these citizens experience the above mentioned “cross-pressures” (Taylor, 
2007) where competing obligations and beliefs are at play. This study would seek to 
understand the way judges, civil servants, and educational leaders such as school 
principals and deans negotiate these tensions as they make moral judgments in their 
work, as well as in their personal lives and in the political sphere. The study would 
examine how, in what ways, and in which public and private contexts religious beliefs are 
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salient for how people make such judgments, particularly related to “world culture” 
norms such as individual rights.  
 One possible case study could be to select participants in a Delhi-based human 
rights education program, the Indian Institute of Human Rights. This is a distance-
learning program that enrolls students from diverse professions across India and grants 
Master’s certificates in human rights. This study could seek to understand how these 
students respond to the issues in the human rights curriculum, the beliefs that they draw 
from to explain their responses, and the meaning of a  “human rights” program to these 
participants3.  
Option two: University Students 
 This study would involve in-depth semi-structured interviews and surveys of 
religious Muslim, Christian and Hindu university students, as well as religious scholars 
and teachers. The aim of this study would be to understand how religious students and 
scholars draw from their beliefs when they make judgments about what is right, and how 
they experience possible tensions between expectations of contemporary secular society 











political participation, or aim for religious diversity but not select for depth of religious 
commitment or political involvement.  
 If Charles Taylor (2007: 595) is correct that many modern citizens inhabit and 
negotiate a space that is neither unselfconsciously religious nor entirely secular, then 
religious university students and scholars in New Delhi, India are likely inhabitants of 
this ‘cross-pressured’ terrain. Like professionals in public institutions, they are likely to 
be well aware of “world culture” principles such as belief in individualism, rationalism, 
progress, equality and universalism through diverse sources, from media in New Delhi to 
the curriculum of their higher education. Yet as religiously engaged members of their 
faiths, they are also likely to be committed to religious teachings that may at times exist 
in tension with these principles. For examples, epistemological beliefs may be a source of 
tension for religious students and teachers. The “new order of knowledge” that 
emphasizes rational, critical inquiry and scientific progress is considered a central 
component of modernity (Kaviraj, 2005). This view may exist in tension with religious 
beliefs that see the source of truth and knowledge as transcendent or unknowable.  
 Furthermore, religious university students and scholars in New Delhi represent a 
sizable and surprising demographic: in South Asia, religious practice is highest and has 
increased the most among the well-educated in urban settings (Stepan, forthcoming 2010; 
Kumar, 2008). This suggests that education and urbanization, two factors that were 
predicted to “modernize” and hence secularize, do not necessarily have that effect, 
lending support to the theory that modernity is indeed ‘multiple.’ However, the successful 
integration of these students and scholars into urban, secular spaces suggests that they 
also do not operate on the basis of purely traditional religion alone. Understanding the 
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way religious university students and scholars in New Delhi negotiate tensions between 
religious beliefs, the universalistic principles of ‘world culture,’ and the pressures of 
contemporary life may thus provide insight into the way modernity is evolving in a 
particular, non-Western context, as well as how “world culture” norms are negotiated at 
the local level. 
Community – NGO Study  
[This section is repeated from my previous seminar paper]  
 Scholars assert that a rights-based conception of justice is not universal and is 
premised on particular beliefs about human nature and the world (Shweder et al., 1997; 
Asad, 2003; Taylor, 2007). Yet a paucity of research investigates the way particular 
communities judge questions of human rights, especially communities where a specific 
advocacy or development program is being implemented. For example, this study could 
be based in a community that is host to a program that promotes equal access to 
education, gender equality, or democratization (e.g. civil society promotion).  This study 
would investigate community members’ judgments on what is right and the beliefs they 
draw upon to explain their ideals, with attention to: whether their conception of justice is 
convergent with or distinct from that of the human rights / development organization; the 
beliefs about the world and human nature that respondents draw from to explain their 
conceptions of what is right; and the implications of these beliefs and judgments for how 
the community responds to the human rights or development program. For example, the 
study would explore whether people in the community believe humans are endowed with 
natural rights and if so, what they believe those rights are, as well as who, if anyone, they 
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believe is responsible for ensuring that these rights are fulfilled. If they do not believe 
that humans are endowed with natural rights, the study would explore whether they 
believe people are endowed with rights by virtue of being part of a family, a community, 
or a nation. If people in this community do not think in terms of “rights,” this study 
would seek to understand the concepts they use to think about wellbeing, and the beliefs 
on which these concepts are premised. As the most successful educational and advocacy 
programs understand the values of the communities with whom they work (Finnemore & 
Sikkink, 1998; Petro, 2004), the goal of this study would be to identify and understand 
the beliefs that conflict and converge with human rights and development goals. This will 
allow human rights and development organizations to frame their work in terms that 
connect to local beliefs, and increase their understanding of resistance to rights that 
conflict with particular beliefs.  
[End of Repeated Section] 
 Qualitative Methodology  
 Semi-structured interview questions will explore how religious citizens in India 
explain judgments on what is right in a variety of “private” and “public” contexts, such as 
issues related to their personal life choices, family, community, school, workplace, 
national political issues and international political issues. Respondents will be asked to 
discuss a time when they and when someone they know had to make a decision about 
“the right thing to do” in these different contexts. They will also be asked their judgments 
on any decisions of which they are aware that have been made by public figures, such as 
political and/or religious leaders. They will further be asked to explain issues that they 
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think are important or troubling in the local, national and international news. Finally, they 
will be presented with hypothetical scenarios in which the protagonist must make a moral 
decision, and will be asked their judgment on the right thing to do in this situation. They 
will be asked to explain why the judgment is “right,” the factors they consider important 
in making the judgment, and how they came to that conclusion, such as through 
consultation with family or religious leaders, independent reflection or religious activity 
such as prayer. Open-ended questions on participants’ own experiences with moral 
choice follow the methodology of Gilligan (1982) while hypothetical scenarios on moral 
reasoning follow the methodology of Shweder et al.’s work in India (1987; 1997).  
Qualitative Data Analysis:  
 Interview transcripts will be analyzed with the aim of understanding the ways in 
which respondents draw from religious beliefs to explain what is right in diverse 
contexts, and the ways in which these judgments converge or diverge with “world 
culture” norms such as endorsement of human rights, individualism, rationalism, and 
universalism. Specifically, I will examine the way respondents reference explicit 
religious teachings, implicit ontological beliefs, and tensions between religious beliefs 
and other considerations.  I explore each of these three aspects of interview analysis 
below.  
Explicit Beliefs 
 I will analyze interviews to understand the contexts and ways in which the 
respondents draw explicitly from religious teachings when explaining how they came to a 
conclusion about what is right. For example, a respondent might explain that they spoke 
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to a religious leader or read a religious text when wrestling over the right thing to do. 
When explaining to me why their conclusion is right, they may reference religious 
teachings. I will analyze whether the extent to which religious teachings are explicitly 
referenced changes depending on whether the issue is “private” (related to personal life 
or family life) or “public” but not necessarily political (related to the workplace, school, 
or community) or political (domestic and international issues and events).  
 These categories are unlikely to be clearly bounded. Indeed, the division between 
public and private is contested, and the assumption that the home is “private” may have 
led to an underestimation of the political importance of issues related to women and girls 
such as divorce, inheritance, domestic violence, and treatment of children (Benhabib, 
1992). Many of these “private” issues are the subject of intense political contestation in 
India, where “personal law” is subject to religious law for religious minorities. 
Furthermore, for those who work in public institutions such as the civil service, “work” 
may be explicitly political. Therefore this design does not assume that the categories of 
public and private are objectively set, but rather aims to understand whether and how 
there is contextual variation in respondents’ references to religious teachings. For 
example, respondents may explicitly reference religious doctrine when explaining what is 
right regarding their personal relationships but draw from secular democratic discourse 
when discussing public policy. Alternately, they may reference religious doctrine 
pervasively across contexts. They may draw from different aspects of religious teachings 
depending on the context as well. For example, respondents might reference a more 
liberal interpretation of their religion when discussing public matters and a more 
conservative interpretation when discussing the home.  
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both implicit beliefs about hum
Implicit Beliefs 
 Interviews will also be analyzed for references to human nature and the nature of 
the world that may be grounded in religious beliefs. Respondents may explain why a 
certain action or policy is right because of “what people are like” and “what the world is 
like.” For example, respondents may explain a judgment on how girls in their family 
should be raised by stating that girls are “naturally different” from boys or that all people 
have “different roles to play4.” Alternately, they may explain their judgment by 
suggesting that  “everyone is basically the same.”5 Respondents may not prioritize the 
promotion of individual rights because “people will eventually get what they deserve6” or 
they may prioritize legal rights based on the explanation that “this world is corrupt7.” If 
asked to explain these judgments, they may reference explicit religious teachings.  
 This follows the methodology of Shweder et al. (1987). Shweder et al. asked 
conservative Hindu Indian respondents to judge whether characters in hypothetical 
scenarios did the right thing, as well as to explain their judgment. Respondents referenced 
















teachings frequently to explain their judgments about what is right. In this way, Shweder 
et al. were able to explore the ways in which religious beliefs informed the moral 
judgments of their respondents8.  
Tensions & Competing Factors 
 A vast range of beliefs, principles and concerns may influence any given moral 
judgment. This may be especially so in the modern world, where the proliferation of 
competing conceptions of the good and religious (as well as non-religious) options may 
have led to the “fragilization” of any particular belief.9 Thus citizens in the modern world 
are likely to experience various cross-pressures between religious faith and secular views, 
as well as competing interpretations of each (Taylor, 2007). Furthermore, theoretical 
scholarship (e.g. Berlin, 1997; Taylor, 1989) as well as empirical studies (Shweder et al., 
1997; Haidt & Graham, 2009) suggest that ultimately, the ideals to which people aspire 
may inherently be in tension.  For example, the ideals of liberty and equality may both be 
valued by a respondent. However maximizing liberty may lead to unequal outcomes, just 
as maximizing equality may constrain liberty (Tocqueville, 1840; Fukuyama, 1992). 
Likewise, the ideal of fairness may be in tension with the ideal of compassion, if a 
punishment is considered warranted but would cause suffering.  










varies across cultures as well as between political groups. For example, liberals in the 
United States are very likely to emphasize the protection of individuals from suffering 
when making a judgment about what is right. Conservatives in the United States are also 
concerned with compassion for those who suffer. However competing values such as 
loyalty to the group and religious purity play a stronger role in their judgments than they 
do for liberals (Haidt & Graham, 2007 & 2009). Similarly, Western samples over all are 
more likely to place the most weight on protection of the individual.  Respondents in 
India also show concern for protection of the individual. However, they also give weight 
(and sometimes more weight) to the good of the community and religious purity 
(Shweder et al., 1997).  
 Furthermore, people in different cultures may sometimes have different views of 
how the individual is best protected. Where a Western respondent may be more likely to 
see equal legal rights as the best protection for individuals, a Hindu Indian respondent 
may be more likely to see protection of individuals as resulting from a network of 
responsibilities that are differently defined depending on position within the family 
(Shweder et al., 1997).  Similarly, a respondent in one culture may believe that 
individuals are best off when they are free to make decisions for themselves, while a 
respondent in another culture may feel that ultimately individuals may be better off when 
following the advice of their family and tradition. Thus the claims of the universal human 
rights movement that human rights values are found in all cultures may be accurate. 
However, it may be that depending on the cultural context, there is variation in the weight 
given to particular values when they are in tension, and in how people believe these 
values are best realized.  
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 The analysis of interviews will give attention to two primary aspects of this 
possible tension between ideals: the principles to which respondents give weight, and the 
relationship of their religious beliefs to competing principles and concerns. I will identify 
which principles respondents seem to prioritize in making judgments about what is right, 
and in what ways these principles reflect or diverge from world culture norms. Empirical 
research has shown that high religiosity is related to more conservative judgments in 
diverse cross-cultural contexts (Jensen-Arnett, 1998). Therefore it is possible that 
university students or professionals in an urban, modern institution may experience a 
tension between liberal values that emphasize individual liberty and universal equality 
(e.g. of gender and religion) and their religious beliefs. Yet scholars also emphasize that 
religious belief is often the source of liberal values and campaigns for liberal politics, 
such as for civil and universal human rights (Appleby, 2000; Johnston, 2003). Thus it is 
also possible that students or professionals in this context will draw from diverse beliefs 
to support world culture norms.   
 I will also explore the role of religious belief in negotiating these tensions. For 
example, respondents may feel torn between religious beliefs and expectations of secular 
society, democratic norms, or other factors such as personal commitments and desires. 
Alternately, respondents may be torn among competing options, and view their religion 
as the ultimate arbiter between competing concerns. This may also differ depending on 
the context. For example, the respondent may reference religious reasons when 
explaining judgments about personal life, but less so when discussing school or politics. 
Thus this component of the study will involve understanding the relationship of religious 
beliefs to the diverse factors that respondents wrestle with when they make and explain 
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judgments about what is right, and how this might vary depending on the area of life in 
which the judgment is made.  
Quantitative Methodology   
 Four quantitative measures will be used to determine whether there are significant 
relationships between normative judgments on what is right, evaluative judgments 
regarding what is true about the social world and human nature, and religious beliefs. In 
order to test normative judgments, surveys will include measures of: (1) the factors 
respondents consider when deciding whether something is just (“Moral Foundations,” 
Graham et al., 2008); and (2) support for human rights (“Human Rights Questionnaire,” 
Diaz-Veizades et al., 1995).  In order to test evaluative judgments, I will use (3) a 
measure of beliefs about human nature and the nature of the world (“Social Axioms,” 
Leung et al., 2002).  Finally, I will use (4) a measure of religious beliefs, including for 
example conceptions of God and religious practice (“Multidimensional Measure of 
Religion / Spirituality”, Idler et al., 2003). Prior research has demonstrated significant 
relationships between evaluative judgments and moral reasoning. In addition, past studies 
have showed that religiosity is significantly related to moral judgments (Jensen-Arnett, 
1998). However this study will make a unique contribution by exploring the interaction 
between all three variables in relation to each other.  I will analyze if and to what extent 
there are beliefs about the world and human nature that correlate with particular religious 
beliefs and whether these beliefs are together associated with particular normative 
judgments.  For example, the belief that God plays an active, guiding role in events may 
correlate with higher levels of social trust, which might correlate with a decreased belief 
that legal protection of individual rights is important. It is also possible that views of 
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human nature and the world independently correlate with particular normative judgments 
and that this relationship is moderated by religious beliefs. For example, agreement with 
“People won’t behave ethically without punishments” may predict lower levels of 
judgment in favor of individual liberty, but belief that God has given each person 
freedom of conscience may moderate this correlation.  
 These surveys will aim to determine whether general trends are evident in the 
relationship between judgments and beliefs for religious respondents in Delhi. However, 
it is likely that numerous factors influence how people form judgments about what is 
right. It is further likely that the influence of particular factors (such as specific beliefs) 
will not be a simple predictive relationship, but rather one of many sources that 
respondents draw from as they negotiate difficult judgments in life and explain those 
judgments to others. Therefore the focus of this study will be investigating how people 
understand and articulate their judgments and beliefs through in-depth semi-structured 
interviews.  
Significance  
 International human rights and democracy-building programs increasingly 
premise their work on the assumption that for religious communities, conceptions of what 
is right will be based partly on religious belief. For example, international organizations 
such as the Center for Religion and Diplomacy and the United States Institute for Peace 
attempt to transform conflicts and promote human rights by emphasizing the ways in 
which local religious teachings support these goals. These programs focus on engaging 
religion as a way to transform conceptions of what is right.  This approach has gained 
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scholarly support (e.g. Johnston, 2003; Appleby, 2000) in recent years, as the role of 
religion in politics is recognized and emphasized by a growing number of social scientists 
(e.g. Calhoun et al., forthcoming 2010; Snyder et al., forthcoming 2010; Philpott, 2007).  
 Of course, a range of factors other than religious or moral considerations may 
influence how people actually behave. People will not always uphold their own principles 
in daily life.  However, given the emphasis of peace-building, international human rights, 
and democracy-building programs on transforming or engaging moral and religious 
principles, it is worthwhile to understand these principles, the beliefs that underlie them, 
and the contexts in which these beliefs are most salient for the individuals who hold 
them. Although people may not always “live up to” their beliefs about what is right, 
much of the work of international institutions is based on the understanding that people 
have the capacity and the will to follow universal normative principles. Therefore 
understanding how people form and explain their normative judgments may support the 
work of institutions that strive to diffuse world culture norms, as well as increase 
understanding of beliefs and judgments that differ from these norms.  
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